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Professor Charles Black's Structure and Relationship in Constitu-
tional Law deserves more attention than it has apparently received.'
First delivered as the Edward Douglass White lectures at Louisiana
State University in 1968, the book presents a graceful, courteous, yet
strongly-committed discussion of a largely neglected method of reason-
ing in constitutional law: what Black calls "the method of inference
from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all
its parts or in some principal part," as contrasted with the dominant
method of "purported explication or exegesis of the particular textual
passage considered as a directive of action.. ."2 In presenting the argu-
ment for this method of structural inference, Black carefully states that
he is not referring to "the higher speculations of jurisprudence; I am
interested, rather, in the thing that would probably most interest an
anthropologist: What basic kinds of legal reasoning, broadly, does the
ordinary, competent American judge see as being open to him when
he has to ascertain and fix the right law for application to a case before
him?" 3 This relatively modest question carries within itself, however,
most of the "higher speculations" about judicial consciousness and
decisional legitimacy which have wracked the field of constitutional
theory in the last two decades, and it is a tribute to Professor Black's
skill that he is able, within his limited framework, to make some sug-
gestive contributions.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. BA. 1964, Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago.
1. It has been the subject of the following reviews: G. Casper, 37 U. C. L. REV. 196
(1969); A. Saipa, 21 HASTINGS LJ. 235 (1969); C. Rice, 38 FoRDHAM L. REv. 603 (1970);
and D. Gould, 22 AD. L. REv. 493 (1970).
2. C. BLACK, STRUCrURE AND RELATiONSHIP IN CONSTrrTiONAL LAW 7 (1969) [hereinafter
cited to page number only]. For a recent elaboration of the structural method, see Black,





Professor Black introduces his theme of structural inference with a
discussion of Carrington v. Rash 4 in which the Court struck down, on
equal protection grounds, a Texas constitutional provision that denied
U.S. military personnel eligibility to vote in the county in which they
were stationed unless they had been residents of that county at the time
of entering the service. Because the Court chose the equal protection
rubric, says Black, "the inquiry had to be whether the particular limita-
tion imposed was 'reasonable.' "5 Since Texas put forward several
plausible reasons for denying servicemen the vote-they are subject to
special pressures, they might be present in such numbers as to over-
whelm a small community, many will be transients, their residence in
the area is involuntary-Black finds it impossible to characterize the
Texas law as "wholly capricious and arbitrary."6 Yet he is prepared to
strike down the law on the basis of his alternative methodology: "The
ground I would have preferred is one sounding in the structure of fed-
eral union, and in the relation of federal to state governments; it can
point to no particular text as its authority. This is a mode of reasoning
which tends to be rejected, or ignored as a possibility, by our legal cul-
ture." 7 In the case of the Texas voting disqualification, his structural
methodology would have enabled Black to embrace an absolute rule
-"no state may annex any disadvantage simply and solely to the per-
formance of a federal duty" 8-rather than the "reasonableness" stan-
dard which he finds necessitated by reliance on the Equal Protection
Clause.
Similarly, Professor Black is not entirely happy with the "textual
exegesis" by which the First Amendment's prohibition of congressional
abridgment of free speech restricts the states through the prism of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He notes that in the
very case in which the Court first articulated a principle of free speech
applicable to the states, Gitlow v. New York,9 the majority affirmed the
defendant's conviction for publishing a rather abstract polemical essay.
He traces this result in part to the Court's application of "the same rule
to state laws infringing the freedom of speech that held good for state





9. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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laws in general-they must not be 'arbitrary.' "10 Moreover, he asserts,
the arbitrariness concept "has continued to exert a sort of influence" as
evidenced by the Court's citation of Gitlow in its opinion in Dennis v.
United States" even though the Dennis case involved a federal law
dearly subject to the First Amendment.
"These confusions," suggests Black, "lead the mind to search for a
more adequate basis for federal constitutional protection against state
interferences with the freedom of speech.' 2 It is his thesis "that such a
basis exists-that the nature of the federal government, and of the
states' relations to it, compels the inference of some federal constitu-
tional protection for free speech, and gives to a wide protection an in-
ferential support quite as strong as the textual support we have been
examining."'13 Because the structure of our federal government is that
of representative democracy, he notes, "discussion of all questions which
are in the broadest sense relevant to Congress's work is, quite strictly,
a part of the working of the national government. If it is not, what is
our mechanism for accommodating national political action to the
needs and desires of the people? And if it is, does it not reasonably fol-
low that a state may not interfere with it?"'4
To supplement the inferences that might be said to flow from the
mere existence of a federal government, and from the important role
in the overall system assigned to the electorate, Black finds another
wellspring in the Constitution's passing recognition, without exhaustive
refinement into attendant rights and duties, of the concept of citizen-
ship. He would infer from the mention of citizenship in the Fourteenth
Amendment a broad congressional "power to declare and give effect
to the rights of citizenship as positive rights to full membership in the
community, without segregation and isolation,"' 5 and thus he finds
altogether unnecessary (though not untenable) the Supreme Court's
reliance on the Commerce Clause to uphold the public accommodations
section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' 6 as well as, presumably,17 the
Court's invocation of the Thirteenth Amendment to sustain federal
open housing legislation. Similarly, freedom from religious coercion
10. P. 37.





16. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
17. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), had not yet come down when Black delivered
the lectures.
178
Vol. 80: 176, 1970
Review
(though not necessarily from establishment), he believes, is a right
properly inferable from the status of citizenship without need to resort
to the incorporation process with its dubious historical underpinnings
and its aftertaste of due process-arbitrariness thinking.'8 Likewise, "an
inference of immunity from arbitrary arrest, oppressive interrogation,
unfair trial, and the like might easily have been drawn from the status
of citizenship, once the decision had been taken to look on that status
as more than the right to a label."'19
Lest it be thought, however, that his approach is a radical departure
in legal reasoning-or, by the same token, totally bereft of support in
precedent-Black points out that inferences from structure and rela-
tionship have long been a part of the American system of constitutional
adjudication. Marshall's reasoning, for example, in the second half of
McCulloch v. Maryland,20 rejecting the state's asserted power to tax a
federal instrumentality, "is, as I read it, essentially structural. It has to
do in great part with what he conceives to be the warranted relational
proprieties between the national government and the government of
the states, with the structural corollaries of national supremacy-and,
at one point, of the mode of formation of the Union."21 The 1868 case
of Crandall v. Nevada,2 2 invalidating a state head tax on the exit of
persons from its borders, is "of the highest methodological interest"
since it was based on neither the Exports-Imports Clause nor the Com-
merce Clause, but rather on "a theory of membership in the national
polity which includes the right to travel unimpeded from state to
state. '23 Black also detects structural reasoning in the many cases testing
state economic regulations against the negative implications of the Com-
merce Clause.24 He admits that "variant theories" have appeared in the
cases, but he is willing to "assert summarily that what sense the subject
has finally received-and that is not total sense-has come precisely
from its transmutation from a problem in textual construction and
single-text implication into a problem about the economic structure of
18. Pp. 61-63.
19. P. 63. Nor are aliens left out of the scheme of inferences. Since aliens "stay here
by national permission, on such terms as the nation imposes," "are to be naturalized
when and as Congress prescribes," and since "[olur relations with them vitally concern
our foreign relations and our foreign commerce," Black finds proper "a general doctrine
of national constitutional preemption when it comes to most state discriminations
against them." Pp. 64-65.
20. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
21. P. 15.
22. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
23. Pp. 15-16.
24. For a collection of such cases see, e.g., LocKHair, KAwissR & CssOPE, CONSTrrU-
TiONAL LAw ch. 6 (3rd ed. 1970).
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nationhood-about the implications of the fact that we are one people,
commercially as otherwise." 25 Black is thus protesting not the exclu-
sivity of the textual mode so much as the "stylistic preference" by which
judges-especially twentieth-century judges-have come to employ the
reasoning process of textual interpretation over that of structural and
relational inference.
The last of his three lectures is devoted to an interesting variant of
the main theme: not only may specific rights and duties be inferred
from the structures and relationships set up by the Constitution, but
general approaches to exercising the function of judicial review may
be similarly inferred. Thus, justices should not always be racked by
self-doubt and intimations of illegitimacy, or be deferential to the
judgments of others when they "confront," in Black's language, officials
and institutions in the forum of constitutional review. Deference is
due only sometimes, depending on "[w]ho, before the Court acts, has
made the critical determination which the Court is asked to reverse?"
2-
To begin with, insofar as "legitimacy in origin is relevant to judicial
or public attitude toward the judicial work"-a question on which
Black takes no stand-"the Court ought to feel no slightest embarrass-
ment about its work of reviewing state acts for their federal constitu-
tionality.' 27 Marshall's effort in Marbury v. Madison28 to justify judicial
review of acts of Congress "may be thought to pose a problem-a prob-
lem to which the right solution was found, I think, but a problem
nonetheless. " 29 But "[t]here simply is no problem about the funda-
mental legitimacy of judicial review of the actions of the states for
federal constitutionality. Article VI says as much, literally and di-
rectly.... On the whole, there is nothing in our entire governmental
structure which has a more leak-proof claim to legitimacy than the
function of the courts in reviewing state acts for federal constitution-
ality."30 Indeed, Black's method of structural and relational inferences
leads him to suggest that "Congress could have provided for this even
without an Article III, simply by creating a court and endowing it with
the power to perform this necessary and proper function."3'
Moreover, even when actions of the federal government are under




28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. P. 73.
30. P. 73-74.1  'Xp
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bury, judicial self-doubt is inappropriate when "what is actually in-
volved is a confrontation between the Court and some official to whose
judgment on constitutionality none of the piously repeated rules of
deference and restraint have anything like the application they might
be thought to have to Congress. "32 In particular, police practices, even
those of federal officials, are not entitled to the same presumption of
constitutionality that should be accorded acts of Congress, otherwise
the defendant "never gets a responsible and competent judgment on
the constitutionality of what has been done to him, never gets a judg-
ment from anybody except his formal adversaries in the criminal
process. That cannot be right."' 3
Likewise, actions instituted by administrative officials under broad
legislative delegations of authority-Black mentions as examples the
Secretary of State's passport decision at issue in Kent v. Dulles34 and the
World War II internment of Japanese-American citizens which was
ordered, at least formally, by the military commander for California 85-
should be reviewed by a judiciary "institutionally free, and indeed
bound, to make its own judgment unembarrassed by presumptions."' 6
Also, no deference is due when the Court is confronting only "parts
of Congress"-such as HUAC pillorying Barenblatt 37 or the House ex-
cluding Adam Clayton Powell3 -in contrast to the complete, formal
legislative process consisting of passage by both houses and either presi-
dential approval or the overriding of a veto.
II.
Because Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law is written
in Black's characteristically elegant yet elliptical style-a style which
sometimes tends to camouflage his many original thoughts-a discussion
of the book may profitably begin with an attempt to articulate exactly
how the structural approach differs from the prevailing mode of textual
interpretation.
First of all, there would seem to be nothing unusual in our con-
stitutional system about the interpretive technique of inferring. In-
ference is commonly employed in a variety of constitutional contexts:
32. P. 77.
33. P. 78.
34. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
35. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
36. P. 79.
37. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
38. Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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to bolster express rights with prophylactic remedies, to protect express
rights with supportive rights, and to supplement express rights with
derivative rights. The search-and-seizure exclusionary rule, for example,
is inferred from the "right of the people to be secure" which is stated
explicitly in the Fourth Amendment. 9 The privilege against self-
incrimination, established by the specific language of the Fifth Amend-
ment, gives rise to the inference that the prosecutor is not to comment
to the jury on the defendant's failure to take the stand.40 The majority
in Griswold v. Connecticut4' inferred from several explicit constitu-
tional provisions which safeguard various aspects of individual privacy
the existence of an omnibus right of privacy which extends beyond
the contours of the explicit provisions. Black's structural and relational
approach is thus distinctive not because it employs inferential reason-
ing, but because the departure points for that reasoning are not the
familiar textual passages of grant or prohibition, but rather other
textual passages that recognize political and societal structures and rela-
tionships without expressly delineating any rights and powers that flow
therefrom.
At various points in the discussion Black refers to seven such
"structures and relationships" (apparently employing the phrase to
denote a generic concept rather than two separate phenomena): 1) the
bare existence, irrespective of its character, of a federal government
that is supreme over the state governments; 2) the fact that the elec-
torate is assigned a central role in the federal government; 3) the exis-
tence of a federal court system as one of the agencies for redress of
citizens' grievances; 4) "the economic structure of nationhood"; 42 5) the
structure of "national unity," quite apart from governmental or eco-
nomic needs, a structure which, for example, "warrants inference as
to mobility of population"; 43 6) the concept of "citizenship"; 7) the
status of "alien." Each of these structures and relationships is either
established in some detail by the text of the Constitution or else is
plainly envisioned by an important provision of that text.44 Thus,
39. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40. See Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609 (1965).
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Pp. 20-21.
43. P. 28.
44. See, e.g., Article VI, section 2 (federal government supremacy); Article I, section 2,
Article IV, section 4, Amendment XIV, section 2, Amendments XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV
(central role of the electorate); Article I, section 8, Article III (federal court system);
Article I, section 8, section 10 (economic nationhood); Article IV, section 2, Article VI,
section 2, Amendment XIV (national unity); Article IV, section 2, Amendment XIV
(citizenship); Article I, section 8, par. 4, Article IV, section 2 (alienage).
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Black does not suggest a free-wheeling, imaginative, highly result-
oriented search for the basic structures and relationships; rather, they
must be "soundly enough established to furnish a basis for this kind
of legal thought." 45
Where Black is prepared to be free-wheeling, imaginative, and
highly result-oriented is in the process of inferring from established
structures and relationships. He offers no guidelines for the eager
law student who would master the methodology of structural inference.
Why, for example, in Carrington v. Rash, do not the overlapping struc-
tures of federal and state government give rise to a "reasonableness"
test rather than to the "no-disadvantage-to-the-performance-of-a-federal-
duty" rule which Black infers? Could not the structure of representa-
tive democracy, with its assumptions of open political dialogue and
periodic free elections, support an inference that the Dennis commu-
nists should not be allowed to participate in a system whose rules they
refuse to accept? The inferences, it would seem, can radiate from the
structures and relationships in a number of ideological directions,
depending on who is doing the inferring. In this regard, Black's system
of inference from textual structures and relationships does not appear
to differ significantly from the familiar system of inferences from the
textual passages of grant and prohibition or from the system of infer-
ences from Anglo-American traditions which Justice Frankfurter and
others employed when attempting to fashion a body of rules and prin-
ciples out of the formless clay of "due process."
46
In a number of other respects, moreover, Black's proposal is linked
to the dominant method of textual interpretation. While his inference
process begins with structures and relationships rather than grants,
prohibitions, traditions and societal norms, the process ends, just as
do the more familiar systems of inference, with rules, principles, pre-
sumptions, ad hoc balancing tests, and the like. In addition, Black
makes it clear that he offers his system of structural and relational
inferences only as a supplement to, not as a substitute for, the domi-
nant technique of textual interpretation: "so long as we continue to
look on our Constitution as a part of the law applicable in court,
just so long the work of sheer textual interpretation will be a great
part-probably the greatest part-of judicial work in constitutional
law."47 And in cases of inconsistency between structural implications
45. P. 23.
46. See, e.g., Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
59 (1947), and Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YA.E LJ. 319 (1957).
47. P. 81.
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and textual commands, the text must prevail, "for the structure and
relations concerned are themselves created by the text, and inference
drawn from them must surely be controlled by the text. 4
Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law deserves to be
treated, therefore, as a serious proposal for reform, not as an impossible
dream. In evaluating the book as a practical reform proposal, two
dimensions of inquiry seem appropriate. First, would a widespread
adoption of the method of structural inference make much of a dif-
ference in the results judges would reach in actual cases? Second, would
structural reasoning improve the process of constitutional interpreta-
tion?
Professor Black, a "judicial activist proudly self-confessed," 49 admits
that his enthusiasm for the structural approach has a lot to do with
the results he believes it would facilitate, results he feels are desperately
needed in a society "sick with the disease of racism." 50 Accepting, for
the moment, the validity and even the sufficiency of such an avowedly
result-oriented justification, is there any reason to believe that a wide-
spread utilization of structural reasoning would actually lead to dif-
ferent judicial results? Black clearly believes that it would, and I share
his belief, although for reasons different than those put forward in his
discussion.
It is doubtful whether there will ever be much agreement among
observers of the legal system on the critical question of whether, and
to what extent, doctrinal formulations exert influence over the re-
sults judges reach. Stated in the abstract, the argument for doctrinal
impact would seem to proceed as follows: If, in fact, some judges are
able (and willing) to decide concrete factual disputes by reasoning
as objectively as possible along established doctrinal lines, then a
major shift in the predominant doctrinal idiom would unquestionably
produce markedly different results. Even if, moreover, judges often
decide disputes by first opting for a particular result on the basis of
intuitive reactions or conscious political preferences, and then reason-
ing backwards to fashion a justification for the results in doctrinal
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there will be instances in which a judge simply cannot justify his
preferred result within the existing doctrinal framework without en-
gaging in the kind of transparent distortion that is sure to bring on
professional, if not public, disapproval. Such disapproval may not deter
a judge who cares only for the result, but it seems that few cases
summon up that kind of strong-arm judicial commitment. For cases
in which the judge's devotion to the result is less than religious, or
in which his sensitivity to professional criticism is especially great, the
availability of a structural justification could save a decision that would
have to be abandoned under a system consisting exclusively of textual
inferences. Furthermore, even in areas of constitutional controversy
like race and dissent where intense judicial preferences tend to over-
ride doctrinal constraints, structural reasoning could affect the judge's
initial intuitive and political preferences by altering the information
that is considered relevant, the policy considerations that are put forth,
and even the lawsuits that are brought, particularly by law reform
groups with long-range litigation strategies.
When the discussion is directed toward specific decisions, however,
it is rather difficult to demonstrate the impact that a shift toward
structural reasoning might have. Black is very careful throughout the
book to illustrate his general ideas with concrete examples, yet in only
five of the more than twenty cases he discusses does he suggest that
the structural approach might have yielded a different result rather
than simply a more satisfying justification for the result that actually
obtained. Four of his five examples of possible doctrinal impact-
Gitlow v. New York, Dennis v. United States, Barenblatt v. United
States, and Korematsu v. United States-seem unpersuasive. Gitlow,
Dennis and Barenblatt were free speech cases in which the regulatory
interest prevailed; it is inconceivable that a Court majority sympathetic
to the speakers could not have found textual support in the First
Amendment, or that a Court majority sympathetic to the regulatory
claim would have felt compelled by a structural argument to rule in
favor of the speakers. Similarly, in Korematsu, it is implausible that
a majority willing to distinguish away seemingly applicable equal
protection principles in order to uphold the internment of Japanese-
American citizens would have ruled differently had the point been
stressed that it was not an action of the "whole Congress" but only
that of a military commander that was under review. Black's fifth ex-
ample, Collins v. Hardyman,51 resulted in the dismissal of a federal
51. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
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prosecution against private individuals who had broken up a public
meeting. The "no-state-action" rationale52 for the decision would have
been avoidable under the structural approach, which could support an
inference of congressional power to punish all interference with the
decision-making processes of the electorate. 3 But Black himself admits
that when the Court is strongly committed to a result, as it has been
recently when racial discrimination has been at issue, state action
"always turn[s] out to be there."5 4 Collins is explicable in terms of
judicial apathy, not doctrinal impotence.
It would be a mistake, however, for result-oriented critics to dis-
miss the structural approach as unimportant simply because these con-
crete examples of possible doctrinal impact are unconvincing. In this
instance, Black's normally helpful penchant for specific examples may
have done his argument a disservice, for the potential impact of struc-
tural reasoning cannot be appreciated by looking solely to past, rather
conventionally-framed disputes involving particular laws or discrete
exercises of governmental or private power. The importance of the
structural approach may lie precisely in its potential for broadening
judicial perspectives. The textual approach is under some strain pres-
ently because it is striving to cope with cosmic, systemic injustices,
such as legislative malfunctioning and political repression, with a set
of rather modest, narrowly-conceived constitutional norms. Because the
structural approach recognizes a much broader, more comprehensive
set of constitutional norms, it may facilitate a judicial response to
citizen complaints that concern systemic shortcomings as well as those
that involve particularized grievances.
Several possibilities come to mind: the system of campaign financing,
the distribution of power within legislatures, the structure of public
school financing, the various processes of natural resource utilization
and dissipation, the balkanized nature of governmental authority in
metropolitan areas, and the system of surveillance and data collection
regarding political beliefs and associations. Presently, it seems, there
is a good deal of dissatisfaction, among persons of widely divergent
political faiths, with many of these "systems." Yet few lawyers, judges,
and legal scholars know much about how the systems really operate,
and fewer still have tried to measure the performance of the systems
52. The Court narrowly construed 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) not to reach the alleged conduct
because "if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act, it raises constitutional
problems of the first magnitude . 8.. . 341 U.S. 651, 659.
53. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (dictum), another example of
structural reasoning in the nineteenth century.
54. P. 55.
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against a coherent set of norms. The complex, integrated injustices of
the current age do not fit easily into the pigeonholes of specific grants
and prohibitions, nor do ancient Anglo-American traditions offer stan-
dards for decision.
Take, for example, the problem of political campaign financing.
Most people probably find it disconcerting that the successful presi-
dential candidate in 1968 spent much more on the campaign than did
his two major opponents, or that the field of viable political candidates
seems to be narrowing to those who can invest huge private fortunes in
the venture or who have previously obtained heavy media exposure as a
result of family associations or success in the world of entertainment
(including space exploration). Is not this overall system of campaign
financing, if suspicions are confirmed, a very serious undermining of
the structure of representative democracy? Should not lawyers, judges,
and legal scholars at least look into current fund-raising practices to see
if they drain the time and energy of the candidate and force him to
make ideological and personnel commitments he would not otherwise
make? Should not the legal community at least explore the feasibility
of effective remedies such as compulsory free media time, detailed ac-
counting requirements, and flat expenditure ceilings keyed to the
number of votes cast in the last election?
It is by no means clear that structural thinking would lead to any-
thing more than a reasoned conclusion that judicial intervention into
the complexities of campaign financing-or school financing, or in-
ternal legislative organization, or the environment-would be both
unmanageable and unwarranted. That conclusion cannot be consid-
ered foreordained, however; the experience with the reapportionment
cases, 5 for example, suggests that novel and complex forms of judicial
intervention can sometimes succeed, even as applied to one of the basic
institutions of the society and in the face of long-standing traditions
and cherished political prerogatives.
The reapportionment cases also suggest, of course, that innovative,
sweeping judicial intervention can germinate under the traditional tex-
tual approach. Developments such as New York Times v. Sullivan56
and the recent relaxation of traditional standing requirements57 under-
55. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General As-
sembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
56. 376 U.S. 255 (1964). See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Mfeaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. RFV. 191.
57. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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score the point. The systemic injustices mentioned above could also
be addressed by the judiciary without resort to structural reasoning;
campaign financing practices, for example, could be scrutinized under
the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or some amalgam
of the two.5s Nevertheless, the structural approach is potentially
important because it might regularize and legitimate the sporadic,
strained broadening of judicial perspectives that is already underway.
An established tradition of structural reasoning might result in judi-
cial scrutiny of systemic injustices as a matter of course rather than as
a matter of spectacular and exceptional doctrinal breakthrough, and in a
judiciary that would feel obliged before opting for nonintervention to
articulate reasons why the Constitution can play no role in the righting
of systemic wrongs.
IV.
For those of us who share Black's general outlook on political and
social problems, and on the question what role the Supreme Court
ought to play in attacking those problems, the structural approach
seems worth a try if there is any possibility that it will lead to better
judicial results-better, that is, in terms of one's own values. Others
with different views, however, will not be persuaded. Recognizing this,
Black quite diligently offers in support of his system a number of
arguments that speak to its virtues as a decision-making process quite
apart from the desirability of the results the process might spawn.
And as was true, unfortunately, for the preceding inquiry concerning
results, a number of these "process-type" arguments can be evaluated
only in terms of one's highly intuitive and highly disputable hypothesis
regarding how judges actually decide constitutional cases.
Black suggests that structural reasoning would enhance predict-
ability, clarity, and candor in the judicial decision-making process.
"Why," he asks, "should one not explicitly base [innovative] holdings,
not on Humpty-Dumpty textual manipulation, but on the sort of
political inference which not only underlies the textual manipulation
but is, in a well constructed opinion, usually invoked to support the
interpretation of the cryptic text?" 59 After describing a particular in-
ference which he would be willing to make, he states "I think this
an eminently sensible implication. You may not think so. If you do not,
58. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
59. P. 29.
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then we can and must begin to argue at once about the practicalities
and proprieties of the thing, without getting out dictionaries whose
entries will not really respond to the question we are putting, or
scanning utterances, contemporary with the text, of persons who did
not really face the question we are asking."0 He concludes his first
lecture, introducing the idea of structural reasoning, with an affirma-
tion of his "faith, fundamentally, that clarity about what we are doing,
about the true or the truly acceptable grounds of judgment, is both
a good in itself, and a means to sounder decision." 61
But what is there to indicate that structural reasoning would not
likewise, and to the same extent, fall prey to "Humpty-Dumpty manip-
ulation"? If, as suggested above, doctrinal constraints exert little in-
fluence in sensitive problem areas such as race and protest, then it
seems likely that judicial decisions in those controversial areas would
continue to be made on the basis of rather crude intuitions and pre-
conceptions, only to be rationalized in terms of some high-minded set
of structural rather than textual inferences, inferences unrelated in
either event to the actual bases for decision. If it were thus true that
the "practicalities and proprieties" that really decide cases for judges
would not be the same "practicalities and proprieties" that would com-
prise structural discourse, the net gain in predictability, clarity, and
candor would be zero.
It is conceivable, on the other hand, that if the structural style of
justification were more commonly and more consciously employed,
it might exert an influence over judges' thought patterns, perhaps re-
sulting in a refinement and sophistication of intuitions and precon-
ceptions-a development which in its own right might constitute a
process-type argument in favor of the structural approach. Any refine-
ment and sophistication, however, would depend on there being some
sort of relationship between the high-minded structural abstractions
that Black has in mind and the essentially mundane, if not crass,
motivations for judicial decision which are of central importance under
the decision-making hypothesis set out above. One such relationship
that seems significant concerns the critical factor of information flow.
To the extent that structural reasoning would result in a refashioning
of lawsuits, with different information coming to the attention of
judges, Black's structural approach may well lead to judicial intuitions




The Yale Law Journal
and thereby, quite apart from the subjective desirability of the results
that might ensue, improvements of "process."
One other process-type argument put forth by Black raises a host of
interesting questions, not only concerning the subtleties of the judicial
psyche but also regarding those "higher speculations of jurisprudence"
which he wishes to avoid. "There has remained," he laments, "a sup-
pressed uneasiness about the incorporation of the First Amendment
into the Fourteenth-suppressed because it came to seem so unthink-
able that there could be no federal protection of free speech against
local interference, but an uneasiness because the conversion of the
phrase 'due process of law' into a statement of preferred position must
continue to be suspected of being arbitrary."62 He even suggests that
the textual approach would be improved by the adoption of a supple-
mentary structural methodology, for the Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment could proceed "with more confidence if we
had the feeling that, after all, it was not mere textual accident in 1866
that made all the difference...."6
At one level, he appears to be saying that "suppressed uneasiness"
is inherently bad for the judicial process because it causes fuzzy think-
ing. While some might argue, as Justice Frankfurter seemingly did,
that suppressed uneasiness is a highly salutary constraint on judges
not directly responsible to the electorate, Black may be attempting to
distinguish between suppressed uneasiness and thoughtful self-restraint.
The latter, it might be suggested, is likely to result in a rational,
measured forbearance commensurate with the Court's strengths and
weaknesses in terms of expertise and political capital. The former,
in contrast, will more often manifest itself in the form of indecisiveness
-in bold moral pronouncements followed by puny remedies, in co-
herent principles applied in an incoherent, erratic fashion. Particularly
in an era when the Court is on the defensive politically, when shrewd,
precise political calculation is called for in order to avoid both foolish
forays and unnecessary retreats, it would seem to be of some importance
that the judicial mind not be clouded with lingering intimations of
illegitimacy.
The problem is that decisions alchemized out of inferences from
structure and relationship might also be "suspected of being arbitrary"
so as to induce suppressed uneasiness. That possibility brings Black
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concerning decisional legitimacy which have, in recent times, been
discussed most frequently (and rather unprofitably, in my opinion)
in terms of Herbert Wechsler's call for "neutral principles." 64
The structural approach cannot be considered an advance in Wechs-
lerian terms: there is nothing to suggest that structural decisions
would be any more "neutral," "generalized," or "principled," whatever
one might mean by those amorphous terms. Black's thesis may, how-
ever, constitute a major contribution to the legitimacy debate in a quite
different and quite neglected regard-that concerning the relevance of
the framers' original intent.6 5
Black rightly believes that a court's fiat, or even its documented
conclusion, as to the framers' intent should not be a sufficient reason
for a constitutional decision-that other requirements such as "prac-
tical rightness" and (perhaps) adequate generality must be satisfied.
But his pronounced discomfort with the disingenuousness of textual
reasoning also suggests-and here one must read between the lines-
a belief that fidelity to some conception of the framers' intentions is
a necessary component of decisional legitimacy.
It is easy to throw around generalizations about "growth" and "keep-
ing in tune with the times" and "adaptation" and the impossibility of
discerning a collective intent, but to be legitimate must not a judicial
decision that purports to override an otherwise sovereign act of will
bear some particular relation to the higher sovereign act of will-the
collective decision to draft, pass, and ratify the relevant constitutional
provision-which is the judicial decision's only ostensible source of
authority? Can a constitutional decision-even a "neutral," "principled"
constitutional decision-ever be legitimate if all the Court can say,
honestly, is "We think this is a good rule and a proper application?"
Should not the Court have to be able to say, honestly, "We think it
more likely than not that the framers (defined as a sufficient majority
at each step in the process) would have thought this a good rule and
a proper application?" Or at least, "We think it more likely than not
that the framers wanted to delegate to us, future generations of jus.
tices, the decision what rule should govern these kinds of cases?"
Perhaps an adequate theory of legitimacy can be built around the
64. Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
65. The best works to date on the nature and relevance of original intent are: A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 98-110 (1962); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE UsEs oF HISTORY (1969); tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 287, 437, 664 (1938) and
27 CALIF. L. REv. 157, 399 (1939); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 119.
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idea of societal acquiescence-a judicial entitlement to power by ad-
verse possession--or upon some notion that the framers "assumed the
risk" when they used general language, but those theories have yet to
be expostulated in any detail.
Judicial activists have tended to shy away from these difficult ques-
tions concerning the original intent-in part, no doubt, because of the
suspicion that those questions have conservative answers. It is striking
how the most careful constitutional scholars content themselves with
flat assertions when it comes time to dismiss the significance of the
framers' original understanding. Martin Shapiro is probably the
most blunt about it: "[E]ven if the historical evidence were clearer
than it is, it is irrelevant." "[I]t is not the founders' intentions but our
intentions that count. ' 66 The attitude takes on a Sisyphean dimension
in the work of Alexander Bickel,67 Robert Burt,68 and Leonard Levy, 69
each of whom punctuates an impressive, careful inquiry into the
framers' specific intent on a given issue with a conclusion that the
specific intent is unimportant.
Black's structural approach may represent a beginning probe in the
quest for a theory of legitimacy that can enable the Court to hand
down bold, catalytic (and, hopefully, politically discreet) decisions
without either having to abandon the symbolic and real advantages
that come from having roots in the past, or else having to engage in a
more-or-less conscious process of distortion in discussing the original
understanding. The structural approach suggests, quite plausibly, that
there was a meaningful original intent-a "sovereign act of will"-
that went into the creation of the Constitution's structures and rela-
tionships as well as into the creation of its grants and prohibitions.
If the structures and relationships embody general values whose mean-
ing and context evolve over time, then dramatic judicial intervention
is appropriate in order to harmonize modern developments with the
general values rooted in the original structure. This intervention can
take the form of creating particular rights, powers, and affirmative
duties that may act as counterweights to structural mutations, or it
may even take the form of direct efforts to change the primary struc-
tures. In any event, the endeavor can be justified as an attempt to
66. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 93 (1966).
67. The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARY. L. REv. 1
(1955).
68. Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
69. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
SION (1963).
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restore (more accurately, to approximate in the modem setting) the
political power equilibrium envisioned by the framers.
Not surprisingly, this line of reasoning raises a host of difficult
questions: is there any reason to believe that inferences from structure
and relationship made by twentieth-century judges will yield a power
equilibrium anything like that envisioned by the framers? Is not it
just as likely that the unhindered evolution of political institutions
would produce that intended equilibrium, or indeed, constitute what
the framers had in mind? Moreover, was there in 1787, or in 1868,
any coherent vision, or even a rough, vague consensus, on what amounts
to "equilibrium" in the distribution of political power? And even if
there were, why should the visions of those two generations be frozen
into eternity? It is one thing to give enduring operative significance
to a few particular, focused value choices that at one time commanded
an extraordinary vote of approval. Similarly, there are strong reasons
for giving enduring significance to a "concept of ordered liberty"
which consists of general norms that have slowly, gradually achieved
consensus approval over a broad span of time. It is quite another thing
to ascribe such significance to a grand design or a radical vision-
even if that design or vision may have commended itself to an entire
age.
These questions are not necessarily unanswerable. One can imagine,
for example, a constitutional theory that persuasively justifies giving
disproportionate, enduring emphasis to the visions of those particular
ages-such as the two great generative periods in American constitu-
tional history, 1787 and 1868-when the polity is boldly striking forth
after a cathartic experience, when interest in politics is at an apex
among the general citizenry, when the most talented men in society
are drawn to the affairs of state, when political thinking and discussion
proceed in terms of overall systems and long-range purposes rather
than increments, adjustments, and crisis responses. One can imagine,
also, a partial answer to skeptics who claim that collective intent,
particularly collective intent involving many different collegial bodies,
is an impossible concept. While the framers may have had to bury
their irreconcilable disagreements in general language, at some point
there must have been a consensus on the minimal content of a partic-
ular clause or structure. Whatever else freedom of the press, for ex-
ample, was intended to mean, there was a clear collective intent that
comprehensive, discretionary licensing of the press by government was
to be prohibited.
While the feared conservative conclusions might eventually result
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from a more elaborate exploration of the concept of original intent,
Black's book is highly suggestive to the opposite effect. Hopefully,
Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law will stimulate other
judicial activists to do battle on this turf, for there is no reason yet
apparent why the original-intent segment of the legitimacy debate
must be forfeited to the advocates of judicial restraint or textual ab-
solutism. In any event, if Black succeeds in encouraging judges,
lawyers, and scholars to think more clearly about the nature and rele-
vance of original intent, he will, by that alone, have contributed to a
significant improvement of the process of constitutional adjudication.
V.
Black concludes by placing his discussion of the structural approach
in perspective: "As I think back over what I have said in these lectures,
I realize that the most I can hope for is that I may have suggested some
lines along which some of you may later find it fruitful to think. One
who reads at all in constitutional law will know, ruefully, that there
is no new thing to be said, and that when you think you have said
something new you later find that others have said much the same
thing before." 70
Whether or not somebody has said much the same thing before,
we can be grateful that Charles Black is saying it now, because now
is when we need to hear it. No doubt this music will sound discordant
to a profession that has long celebrated the virtues of "thinking small."
But unless the legal profession accepts Professor Black's invitation to
start "thinking big," there is a danger that the judiciary will be un-
equipped to play even its customary catalytic role in the nation's coming
political experience. That prospect should be deeply troubling (and
energizing) to those who do not wish to see such issues as prison
conditions, civil commitment practices, media access, plastic and neon
ugliness, overpopulation, data collection, political party structures, and
biological behavior control (and thought control) left to the unprodded
and unchecked statesmanship and foresight of legislators.
70. P. 93.
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